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The Pinkerton Problem
Bruce A. Antkowiak*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the unlikely event that any junior faculty member should ever ask
me for advice about how to write a law review article, I would give them
this highly non-academic bit of counsel. First, find a real problem in the
law, one that affects real people and one that can be addressed by judges
and practitioners in the area. Second, help them find a way to solve it.
Granted, this flies in the face of the conventional wisdom that law review
articles should be laborious expositions of exhaustive research into
esoteric points, grandiosely displayed, and targeted solely for other
academics in a display reminiscent of peacocks flashing their plumage at
the zoo. But as I am neither peacock nor traditional academic, my advice
stands, and I seek to follow it here.
Indeed, if I am any animal, I am an old criminal law warhorse who
cares deeply that the system do its vital work in the way the Constitution
intended. The problem addressed in this article strikes at these concerns.
It was first brought to my attention when a member of a Committee I
chair to draft and revise the Pennsylvania Criminal Jury Instructions
complained that the current Pennsylvania instruction on the liability of a
conspirator for substantive crimes committed by a co-conspirator
(something we all know as the Pinkerton' charge) was wrong or,
minimally, incomplete.2 The Committee had to conclude, however, that
since that instruction accurately reflects the teachings of the
* Program Director, Criminology, Law, and Society, St. Vincent's College.
1. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
2. This individual is Professor Jules Epstein of Widener University School of Law.
I thank him and Professor Rona Kaufman Kitchen, of Duquesne Law School for their
insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article. While I am at the business of
thanking, I recognize the fine work initially done on this problem by James Pollock, a
recent graduate of Duquesne Law School who prepared a seminar paper on this point,
and my able research assistants, Megan Will and Darren Belajdac. Finally, I deeply
appreciate the selfless efforts and counsel of all members of the Pennsylvania Suggested
Standard Criminal Jury Instructions Committee for their wisdom, counsel and patience
with their Chairman.
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the matter, no change could be made. A
change, however, should be made once the courts of Pennsylvania and
virtually every other place where a Pinkerton charge is used realize what
a serious constitutional problem the Pinkerton doctrine presents.
As always, a simple, concrete example will help frame the issue.
Moe and Larry agree to burglarize Curly's house to steal his baseball
card collection.3 They agree to meet at the front of Curly's house at 9
P.M. (when they know Curly is not home) and plan to force in the back
door to gain entry. When Moe gets there at 9 P.M., he does not see
Larry. A moment later, Larry walks out of the front door of Curly's
house, explaining that on his way there, he stopped and stole a ladder
from a hardware store. He used the ladder to climb in through an open
window on the second floor in the back of the house. Moe tells Larry to
go back in the house to search for the baseball cards while he stays out
front as a look-out in case police come. Larry finds the card collection
and climbs out the back window and down the ladder. By the time he
reaches the back yard, Shemp, a neighbor, runs over, yells and tries to
grab him. Larry runs by Shemp, giving him a hard push as he goes by.
Shemp falls, striking his head against a garden gnome, suffering a
serious concussion.
Larry is guilty of conspiracy to commit burglary, burglary, the
intentional theft of the ladder and the reckless infliction of serious bodily
harm on Shemp (aggravated assault). Moe is clearly guilty of the first
two offenses, but is he guilty of the last two as he had neither direct
knowledge of nor direct involvement in the acts of Larry that constituted
those substantive crimes?
The Pennsylvania jury considering Moe's guilt would, in accord the
teachings of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, receive this instruction:
1. There are two basic ways that one defendant may be criminally
responsible for conduct committed by another person or persons.
These two ways may apply even if the defendant in question was not
present at the time and place when the particular act occurred.
2. The first way is for the defendant to be a member of a
conspiracy....
3. As applied in this case, if it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant, Moe, was indeed a member of a conspiracy, he
may be held responsible for the act or acts of Larry if each of the
following elements is proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
3. I credit James Pollock, supra note 2, for suggesting these names. If the reader
does not recognize them, the reader has missed out on something important in this life.
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a. that Larry was also a member of the same conspiracy;
b. that the crime in question was committed while the
conspiracy was in existence; and
c. that the crime in question was committed to further the goals
of the conspiracy.4
Those generally familiar with Pinkerton instructions in almost every
other jurisdiction that embraces the doctrine will already sense an issue
here, as this language omits the element that Larry's theft and assault
must also have been reasonably foreseeable to Moe.5 Reasonable
foreseeability was, after all, part of Pinkerton from the outset. The
United States Supreme Court derived Pinkerton from the simple
syllogism that since one conspirator can commit the overt act and
complete the crime of conspiracy as to all, there is no reason why "other
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy are likewise not attributable to the
others for the purpose of holding them responsible for the substantive
offense."6 This newly found (and vast) theory of liability, however,
needed specific limits:
A different
one of the
conspiracy,
was merely

case would arise if the substantive offense committed by
conspirators was not in fact done in furtherance of the
did not fall within the scope of the unlawful project, or
a part of the ramifications of the plan which could not be

4. PA. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONs, § 8.306(a) (2005). This Instruction is drawn
from cases such as Commonwealth v. Wayne, 720 A.2d 456 (Pa. 1998) and
Commonwealth v. Simpson, 754 A.2d 1264, 1274 (Pa. 2000). It goes on to indicate that
the second way for such liability to attach is via the accomplice liability doctrine.
There is a basic difference between being an accomplice and being a conspirator. In
a conspiracy, people agree to act jointly. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 903 (2010). To be an
accomplice, a person does not have to agree to help someone else; the person is an
accomplice if he or she, on his or her own, acts to help the other person commit a crime.
18 Pa. C.S.A. § 306 (2010). More specifically, the defendant is an accomplice of another
for a particular crime if the following two elements are proved beyond a reasonable
doubt:
a. that the defendant had the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission
of that crime; and
b. [the defendant [solicits] [commands] [encourages] [requests] the other person
to commit it] [or] [[aids] [agrees to aid] [or] [attempts to aid] the other person in planning
or committing it].
It is important to understand that a person is not an accomplice merely because he or
she is present when a crime is committed, or knows that a crime is being committed. Id.
5. See discussion, infra.
6. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946).
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reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the
unlawful agreement.7
Pennsylvania's charge contains the in furtherance of limit and the limit
relating to the scope of the unlawful plan, but omits reasonable
foreseeability. As Moe cannot argue that that he could not reasonably
foresee that Larry would steal a ladder or violently push Shemp, Moe is
in big trouble in Pennsylvania.
To be sure, the plight of Moe the burglar is hardly something to
occasion anyone to engage in an outpouring of compassion or
condolence on a personal level. But we are lawyers and, where due
process is concerned, the Constitution requires an exercise of
professional dispassion. As we will see, convicting Moe under a theory
that operates outside the confines of the Constitution is a problem of
significant proportions that merits our concern, personal feelings to one
side notwithstanding.
Here, that problem exists on two levels. On the first, if Professor
Alex Kreit is correct in his recent article that the in furtherance of and
reasonablyforeseeable components of Pinkerton are the due process
limits the federal Constitution imposes on conspirator liability,9 then the
Pennsylvania instruction violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantees of individual deprivation of "life, liberty or property without
due process of law."10 Any jurisdiction that omits one of these limits
will face the compelling argument that half of due process is no due
process at all. I will address this first level problem by pointing out that
the Pennsylvania's omission of reasonable foreseeability is inconsistent
with almost every other jurisdiction in this regard and by recapping
Professor Kreit's analysis that such an omission violates due process.
But the real Pinkerton problem runs much deeper. It exists
regardless of whether a jurisdiction embraces it with all of its conditions
and caveats in place. In any jurisdiction that has not adopted the
Pinkerton doctrine by statute, that is, where it exists solely as a judicially
created theory of liability, the Pinkerton doctrine operates to violate,
a) the basic principles of separation of powers, and, b) the most
fundamental precepts of criminal due process by allowing the
govemment to convict someone without having to prove all of the
statutory elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Through
7. Id. at 647-48.
8. The jury Instruction quoted above, PA. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 8.306(a)
(2005), contains no reference to foreseeability, consistent with the cases from which the
Instruction is drawn. See supra note 4.
9. Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the ConstitutionalDimensions of
Pinkerton, 57 AM. U.L. REv. 585, 586-87, 592, 604-15 (2008).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Pinkerton, courts dilute and radically alter the elements of a substantive
offense (especially its mens rea) in violation of the legislative will and a
cornucopia of constitutional rights the United States Supreme Court has
championed during the last twenty years." It is a problem others have
sensed already,12 and it is time to confront it once and for all.
The resolution of the problem, however, must not create problems
of its own. While Pinkerton should be shelved as a separate and distinct
theory of liability, 3 care must be taken not to adopt the notion that
membership in a conspiracy is irrelevant to a defendant's guilt for
substantive crimes committed by those with whom he acts in concert.
Defendants join conspiracies intentionally and knowingly, not recklessly
or impulsively. Their actions after joining a scheme may well allow a
jury to infer that they intended crimes secondary to the ultimate object
offense or that, by their conduct, they knowingly created the sort of risks
that would support a finding of criminal recklessness.14 Properly
instructing a jury on how to assess those matters is the key practical and
constitutional goal for courts, practitioners and the system as a whole.
It is the kind of thing a law review article really should address.
II.

THE PENNSYLVANIA RULE: PINKERTON LIGHT

The clearest statement of the conspirator liability doctrine in
Pennsylvania is found in Commonwealth v. Wayne:' 5

11. These rights are delineated in my discussion of the application of the Apprendi
doctrine to this area, discussed at length, infra note 96 et. seq. The jurisdictions which
have undertaken to dilute the rights involved would include all courts within the federal
system and the state courts set forth infra note 35.
12. Professor Kreit has pointed out that while there is relatively little discussion of
the current methodology in this area in the courts and literature, confusion on the issue is
evident. See Kreit, supra note 9, at 587-89.
13. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1962); LaFave, Criminal Law, 5th Edition,
§ 13.3, at 722-24 (2009).
14. For example, in Commonwealth v. Weimer, 977 A.2d 1103, 1105 (Pa. 2009), a
defendant participated with several others in a violent assault on her old boyfriend,
resulting in her conviction for third degree murder. While the Court would come to the
odd conclusion that there is an offense of conspiracy to commit criminal homicide, the
defendant's acts as a member of a conspiracy to commit aggravated assault might clearly
lead to her satisfying the recklessness/malice element of third degree murder. Id. at 1106;
but see id at 1107-1110 (indicating that conspiracy is a crime requiring specific intent
and some degrees of homicide are not specific intent crimes); see also Commonwealth v.
King, 990 A.2d 1172 (Pa. Super. 2010); Commonwealth v. Marquez, 980 A.2d 145 (Pa.
2009).
15. Commonwealth v. Wayne, 720 A.2d 456 (Pa. 1998). Wayne was a "set-up" man
in a killing accomplished directly by his conspirators. He argued that the Pennsylvania
rule wrongly exposed him to liability for first degree murder as he could be convicted
without proof he shared the specific intent to kill the victim. The Supreme Court agreed,
although it denied him relief based on a harmless error finding. Id at 465.
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The general rule of law pertaining to the culpability of conspirators is
that each individual member of the conspiracy is criminally
responsible for the acts of his co-conspirators committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy. The co-conspirator rule assigns legal
culpability equally to all members of the conspiracy. All coconspirators are responsible for actions undertaken infurtherance of
the conspiracy regardless of their individual knowledge of such

actions and regardless of which member of the conspiracy undertook
the action. The premise of the rule is that the conspirators have
formed together for an unlawful purpose, and thus, they share the
intent to commit any acts undertaken in order to achieve that purpose,
regardless of whether they actually intended any distinct act

undertaken in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy. It is the
existence of shared criminal intent that "is the sine qua non of a
conspiracy." 16
Wayne carved out only one exception to this rule. Just as in cases
involving accomplice liability,17 a defendant cannot be found guilty of
first degree murder under conspiratorial liability unless he personally
shared the specific intent to kill the victim.' 8 The reasons for this
exception are critical to our more extensive analysis of the Pinkerton
problem, but for now, simply note that for all other crimes, the basic rule
of Wayne applies. It assigns guilt to conspirators for the substantive
crimes of their confederates regardless of whether they knew, intended,
or foresaw those crimes.
Wayne is plainly inconsistent with Pinkerton insofar as reasonable
foreseeability is concerned. But a Pennsylvania prosecutor confronted
with that assertion can readily retort that Wayne is not derived from
Pinkerton at all. In fact, Pinkerton has only been cited three times in
Pennsylvania, and never for the rule articulated in Wayne.19
Unfortunately for the prosecutor, however, the retort rings hollow
because Wayne actually evolved from cases that are not really authority
for the broad rule Wayne derives from them. Those cases involved
situations where the substantive crime attributed to the defendant was the
object crime of the conspiracy itself, not some secondary offense that

16. Id. at 463-64 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
17. See Commonwealth v. Huffman, 638 A.2d 961 (Pa. 1994).
18. Id. at 962.
19. Wayne was cited in two cases dealing with the minor issue in Pinkerton of
whether the penalty for the conspiracy merges with the penalty for the substantive crime
the conspiracy intended (it does not). See Commonwealth v. Boerner, 422 A.2d 583 (Pa.
Super. 1980); Commonwealth v. Belgrave, 269 A.2d 317 (Pa. Super. 1970). See also
Commonwealth v. Dutrieuille, 17 Pa. D. & C. 4" 321 (1982) (discussing Pinkerton in
connection with "Wharton's rule").
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was the primary responsibility of a co-defendant. 20 Nonetheless, the
cases anointed the broader conspirator rule as "hornbook law," relying
on the 1955 Burdell case,21 which in turn relied on the wellspring of this
jurisprudence in Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Strantz.2 2 But, upon
closer examination, Strantz is not authority for the broad rule of Wayne
that excludes foreseeability from the Pinkerton equation and generally
makes conspirators liable for crimes in which they did not share the
requisite mens rea with the one who performed the actus reus of the
charged crime. We will undertake that examination as soon as we have
recounted the grisly tale of Walter Strantz and his sidekick, Joe
Yircavage.
Strantz and Joe Yurcavage were true partners in crime, setting out
on an April 1937, crime spree of "robbery, murder, attempted murder
and general deviltry." 23 In all, and in one evening, they murdered two
people, shot two others, shot at several more (including a State Trooper
who was shot "through the hat"), threatened a half dozen other citizens,
and committed four robberies.24 The evidence was so strong against
them that the Court said that if it was insufficient, then "all human
evidence has lost its potency." 25
The Strantz Court did not have before it a classic conspirator
liability issue at all, however, as both men were partners in each bit of
malfeasance. It was a classic circumstance of accomplice liability, and
while the Court saw that, it unfortunately conflated that doctrine with
conspiracy law in this critical passage of the opinion:
If one aids and abets in the commission of a crime, he is guilty as a
principal. One is an aider and abettor in the commission of any
crime, i.e., he has "joined in its commission," if he was an active
partner in the intent which was the crime's basic element. Chief
Justice Gibson in Rogers v. Hall, 4 Watts 359, said: "The least
degree of concert or collusion between parties to an illegal
transaction makes the act of one the act of all." No principle of law is

more firmly established than that when two or more persons conspire
or combine with one another to commit any unlawful act, each is
criminally responsible for the acts of his associate or confederate
committed in furtherance of the common design. In contemplation of

20. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 485 A.2d 1102 (Pa. 1984); Commonwealth v.
Roux, 350 A.2d 867 (Pa. 1976); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 336 A.2d 300 (Pa. 1975).
21. Commonwealth v. Burdell, 110 A.2d 193 (Pa 1955).
22. Commonwealth v. Strantz, 195 A. 75 (Pa. 1937).
23. Id. at 77. The penalty for general deviltry is unknown but it undoubtedly was set
to run consecutively with Strantz's death sentence. It would also be imposed in a court
from which there is no appeal.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 80.
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law the act of one is the act of all. See Collins v. Corn., 3 S. & R.
220; Corn. v. Brown, 58 Pa. Super. Ct. 300; and Corn. v. Snyder, 40
Pa. Super. Ct. 485. 26

Note how once the Court quoted from a civil case (Rogers v. Hall) the
wheels came off of this analysis as it wildly diverted from talk of simple
accomplice liability to conspirator liability as if that transition was
seamless.2 7 Moreover, the three criminal cases the Court cited for this
"firmly established" principle were not classic Pinkerton situations either
as the issue in each was simply whether the Commonwealth proved its
conspiracy count by showing that one conspirator accomplished an overt
act. 8
Thus, none of the significant older cases that preceded Wayne speak
of reasonable foreseeability because the limited factual contexts in which
they arose did not present that issue. When the more recent ones did not
pick up on it either, 29 Pennsylvania ended up with a rule that placed it on
an island insofar as conspirator liability rules are concerned.
Of the nine federal circuits that publish standard jury instructions,
six explicitly require proof that the crime of the conspirator not only be
committed during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, but
that the defendant must have been able to reasonably foresee its
commission. 3 0 Two more (the Fifth and Tenth Circuits) require either
that the crime was in furtherance or that it was reasonably foreseeable to
the defendant. 3 1 The Eighth Circuit requires the "in furtherance of'
proof plus either a showing that the crime was within the scope of the

26. Id. at 79.
27. Id.
28. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 58 Pa. Super. 300, 309 (1914); Commonwealth v.
Snyder, 40 Pa. Super. 485, 523 (1909); Collins v. Commonwealth, 3 Serg. & Rawle. 220,
223 (1817).
29. Strantz was, for example, an authority relied upon by Commonwealth v. La, a
case heavily relied upon by Wayne. See Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 753 A.2d 1265 (Pa.
2000); Commonwealth v. Simpson, 754 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. La,
640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
30. See MANUAL OF FED. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT § 4.03
(1998); MANUAL OF FED. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT § 7.03
(2001); MANUAL OF FED. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT § 3.10 (2005);
MANUAL OF FED. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 5.09 (1999);
MANUAL OF FED. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT § 8.20 (2003);
MANUAL OF FED. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT § 13.5 (2003).
31. See FIFTH CIRCUIT DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(CRIMINAL CASES) § 2.22 (2001), available at http://www.1b5.uscourts.gov/jury
instructions/fifth/crim200l.pdf, CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE TENTH
CIRCUIT § 2.21 (2006), available at http://www.calO.uscourts.gov/downloads/pjil0-circrim.pdf. If Professor Kreit is right, this alternative rendering is constitutionally suspect.

See Kreit, supra note 9.
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agreement or that it was reasonably foreseeable. 3 2 The three circuits that
do not publish standard instructions nonetheless all speak in their case
law of the "reasonable foreseeability" requirement as an inherent part of
Pinkertonliability. 3 3
A significant number of states also employ Pinkerton.34 Those
states almost universally require the government to prove both that the
crime was done in furtherance of the unlawful agreement and that it was
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.3 5 Indiana approves a charge that
does not necessarily use the "in furtherance of' language but does
require that the act be one that is the "natural and probable" consequence
whlt
of the agreement. 36 And while there is some debate about the exact
formulation of the rule in Illinois, 37 it seems to mirror the Indiana
treatment.38
Pennsylvania thus appears unique in having a rule that takes
reasonable foreseeability completely out of the equation. If Professor

32.

See MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

§ 5.06J (2009),

available at http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/crim
man 2009.pdf. Again, this opens a constitutional challenge here.
33. See United States v. Ledbetter, 381 F. App'x 292, 296-97 (4th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Shaw, 354 F.App'x 439, 445 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Hemphill, 514
F.3d 1350, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
34. Kreit, supra note 9, at 597-99. Professor Pauley provides a wonderful discussion
of the history of the growth and acceptance of Pinkerton. See Matthew A. Pauley, The
Pinkerton Doctrine andMurder, 4 PIERCE L. REv. 1, 4-6 (2006).
35. In Bolden v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court identified the following states as
adopting this rule: Arkansas, Connecticut, Kansas, Florida, Georgia, Rhode Island, and
Texas. Bolden v. State, 124 P.3d 191, 197 n.27 (Nev. 2005) (citing Matthews v. State,
940 S.W.2d 498 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997)); State v. Walton, 630 A.2d 990 (Conn. 1993);
State v. Tyler, 840 P.2d 413 (Kan. 1992); Martinez v. State, 413 So. 2d 429 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); Everritt v. State, 588 S.E.2d 691, 693 (Ga. 2003); State v. Harnois, 853 A.2d
1249 (R.I. 2004); Barnes v. State, 56 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. App. 2001). To this list we may
at least add the District of Colombia, Nebraska, New Jersey, California, Colorado,
Maryland, and Virginia. See Perez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39 (D.C. 2009), CastilloCampos v. United States, 987 A.2d 476 (D.C. 2010); State v. Thomas, 314 N.W.2d 15
(Neb. 1981); State v. Bridges, 628 A.2d 270 (N.J. 1993); People v. Zielesch, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); People v. Trujillo, 509 P.2d 794 (Colo. 1973);
Grandison v. State, 506 A.2d 580 (Md. 1986); Owens v. Commonwealth, 675 S.E.2d 879
(Va. Ct. App. 2009). Connecticut and Rhode Island have both recently affirmed
Pinkerton. State v. Coward, 972 A.2d 691 (Conn. 2009); State v Berroa, No. 2008-53C.A., 2010 R.I. LEXIS 102 (R.I. 2010).
36. See Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098,1110 (Ind. 1998).
37. Responsibility for Crimes of Co-Conspirators, 1-4 ILL. CRIM. LAW § 4.10,
(LEXIS 2010).
38. See People v. Vettese, 377 N.E.2d 1168, 1170 (111. 1978) (citing People v. Tate,
345 N.E.2d 480, 483. (111. 1976)). The Tate court stated: "Where one attaches himself to
a group bent on illegal acts . . . he becomes criminally liable for any wrongdoings
committed by other members of the group in furtherance of the common purpose, or as a
natural or probable consequence thereof, even though he did not actively participate in
the overt act itself." Tate, 345 N.E.2d at 483.
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Kreit is correct in his central thesis, the Pennsylvania rule thus offends
due process.
III. THE PENNSYLVANIA RULE AND DUE PROCESS
Professor Kreit ably supports his conclusion that from the time of its
first articulation in Pinkerton, the "in furtherance of' and "reasonably
foreseeable" limitations were seen as the constitutional sine qua non for
attributing a crime to a defendant under a vicarious liability theory.3 9
These limits are more than just a nuance of the federal system,
inapplicable to a state like Pennsylvania that traces its conspirator
liability theory to a source other than Pinkerton. Kreit's review of
relevant case law over an extended period demonstrates that "in
furtherance of' and "reasonably foreseeable" are the due process
baselines for criminal liability in this area.40
He points out that, in the wake of cases like United States v.
42
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Alvare 4 1 and United States v. Castenada,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all specifically embraced
the idea that foreseeability is "the main concept underlying a due process
analysis" of a Pinkerton type case.4 3 As our review of circuit practices
demonstrates, whether the circuits specifically embrace foreseeability as
a constitutional component or not, all circuits include it as part of a
Pinkerton charge in one form or another. Reasonable foreseeability is a
due process necessity because to support the defendant's guilt for the
substantive crime requires at least a finding of criminal negligence.
Without at least that finding, the defendant's relation to the substantive
crime would be too tenuous to withstand a challenge under the Due
Process clause. 44
The Connecticut Supreme Court recently articulated the importance
of foreseeability in the Pinkerton rule. In State v. Coward, the court
acknowledged that Pinkerton attributes liability for a substantive offense
to a defendant who did not personally have the mens rea that offense
requires.45 The court justified that attribution on the theory that, by
conspiring, a defendant did more than bring the object crime of the
agreement closer to fruition. By his negligence in failing to reasonably
foresee the acts of his confederates, he also increased the risk that other
39. Kreit, supra note 9, at 599.
40. Id at 603-06. See also Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A "New" Due
ProcessLimit on Pinkerton ConspiracyLiability, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 104-05 (2006).
41. United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830 (1Ith Cir. 1985).
42. United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 1993).
43. Kreit, supra note 9, at 601-06.
44. Id. at 612-13.
45. State v. Coward, 972 A.2d 691, 700-01 (Conn. 2009).
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crimes necessarily attendant to the object crime's commission would
occur:
Thus, the focus in determining whether a defendant is liable under the
Pinkerton doctrine is whether the coconspirator's commission of the
subsequent crime was reasonably foreseeable, and not whether the
defendant could or did intend for that particular crime to be
committed. In other words, the only mental states that are relevant
with respect to Pinkerton liability are that of the defendant in relation
to the conspiracy itself, and that of the coconspirator in relation to the
offense charged. If the state can prove that the coconspirator's
conduct and mental state satisfied each of the elements of the
subsequent crime at the time that the crime was committed, then the
defendant may be held liable for the commission of that crime under
the Pinkerton doctrine if it was reasonably foreseeable that the
coconspirator would commit that crime within the scope of and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.46
By omitting foreseeability, the Pennsylvania rule allows for
vicarious liability to be assessed without any proof that the defendant
was criminally negligent with respect to the substantive crime his
conspirator committed. As long as Larry committed a crime during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, Pennsylvania renders Moe's
guilt a matter that is essentially one of strict liability.
IV. THE DEEPER PROBLEM: PINKERTON AND THE JURY RIGHT

This would be a short and quite parochial article if the only problem
were that Pennsylvania needed to insert reasonable foreseeability into its
conspirator liability formula. But the problem with Pinkerton runs much
deeper and is not confined to the jurisprudence of Pennsylvania.
A.

Pinkerton and the FailedSearchfor Limits

This deeper problem begins to emerge when we realize that courts
have nervously and clumsily layered additional limits on Pinkerton with
unstructured rules that call for little more than "fairness" in its
application.4 7 In other words, the courts seem to sense that there is a
bigger problem but just cannot figure out what it is or how to deal with it.
If Pinkerton were perfectly consistent with the constitutional protections
of due process, then the application of its internal components (the "in
furtherance of' and "reasonable foreseeability" aspects) should be
enough to satisfy that end. But it is not, as courts consistently hold.
46. Id. at 701.
47. See generally id. at 691.
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As Professor Kreit points out, the same courts that have propounded
the need for the two primary Pinkerton limits have recognized in each
case that a further check is also required.48 The Coward Court
recognized this as well:
We also have concluded, however, that "there may be occasions
when it would be unreasonable to hold a defendant criminally liable
for offenses committed by his coconspirators even though the state
has demonstrated technical compliance with the Pinkerton rule....
For example, a factual scenario may be envisioned in which the
nexus between the defendant's role in the conspiracy and the illegal
conduct of a coconspirator is so attenuated or remote,
notwithstanding the fact that the latter's actions were a natural
consequence of the unlawful agreement, that it would be unjust to
hold the defendant responsible for the criminal conduct of his
coconspirator. In such a case, a Pinkerton charge would not be
,,49
appropriate.
Federal courts too have recognized that, even when the act was in
furtherance and was reasonably foreseeable, "due process constrains the
application of Pinkerton where the relationship between the defendant
and the substantive offense is slight."o
But while these courts speak of the need for a second layer of due
process analysis in Pinkerton cases, they do not suggest the make-up of
that critical methodology. In United States v. Hansen,5 1 a district court
recognized this odd state of affairs and the judiciary's failure to find a
meaningful outer limit to Pinkerton.
Certainly, the Hansen court observed, this second, outer layer is not
made of "reasonable foreseeability," as "it is quite simply illogical to say
that Pinkerton, which is defined by foreseeability, could somehow be
more narrowly 'constrained' by due process if due process requires
nothing more than foreseeability." 52 Foreseeability, after all, is a term
from the vocabulary of torts, and the restraints of due process in the
criminal realm should require a harness made of sterner stuff." But a
closer inspection of precedent allowed the Hansen court to conclude only
that while "something more than mere foreseeability is at work" 54 and

48. Kreit, supra note 9 at 603-06. See also Noferi, supra note 40, at 147-55.
49. Coward, 972 A.2d at 701 (internal citation omitted).
50. United States v. Castenada, 9 F.3d 761, 766 (9th Cir. 1993).
51. United States v. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D. Mass. 2003). Professor Kreit
discusses Hansen as well. See Kreit, supra note 9, at 613 n.155-56.
52. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 67 n.3.
53.

Id.

54.

Id.
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that the "something more" was "deeper and more visceral"'55 than
foreseeability, "the law has not yet developed clear and cogent standards
to assess the outer due process limits of Pinkerton."56
The Pinkerton doctrine has been around for a long time. Yet a court
can do no better to limit it than to say that it should not be applied when
its application would be "unreasonable" or "unjust" or "not . . .
appropriate." 57 The only yardstick a court has fashioned to gauge when a
defendant's relationship to a substantive crime is not enough to hold him
liable for it is calibrated with terms like "slight." Methodologically, a
judicial solution using language that invites arbitrary and capricious
application is a telltale sign that the true problem lies at levels deeper
than the solution-maker appreciates. Perhaps, then, the courts are
admitting that they do not understand the underlying problem these
"limits" seek to address.
But the failed methodology of this "second layer" of Pinkerton due
process protection contains a further telltale sign of the real problem: it
assumes that a jury is too stupid to apply it. The second layer is meant
only for judicialapplication. This ignores the fact that not only are juries
capable of affixing criminal liability by applying facts to the elements of
an offense, but also they are the body constitutionally mandated to fulfill
that role. Just as the due process violations Pinkerton causes cannot be
avoided merely by hoping that prosecutors will charge cases in ways that
will never let those problems arise,59 courts alone cannot be expected to
cure those problems with a dose of "fairness" after the fact.
Of course, the courts' effort to find a sensible second layer of
protection for Pinkerton issues was doomed from the start. It assumed, a
priori,the validity of Pinkerton and failed to take a critical look at what
Pinkerton is and how it operates. 60 With that critical reflection, however,
the real problem reveals itself. As a judicially created theory of liability,
Pinkerton represents a frontal assault on both principles of separation of
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. State v. Coward, 972 A.2d 691, 701 (Conn. 2009) (quoting State v. Diaz, 679
A.2d 902, 911 (Conn. 1996)).
58. I have discussed the role of the jury with respect to various findings it is required
to make. See Bruce A. Antkowiak, The IrresistibleForce, 18 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L.
REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Antkowiak, IrresistibleForce]; Bruce A. Antkowiak, The Art
of Malice, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 435 (2008) [hereinafter Antkowiak, Art of Malice]; Bruce
A. Antkowiak, The Ascent of an Ancient Palladium: The Resurgent Importance of Trial
by Jury and the Coming Revolution in Pennsylvania Sentencing, 13 WIDENER L. J. 11
(2003) [hereinafter Antowiak, Ascent ofan Ancient Palladium].
59. See United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 850 n.25 (11th Cir. 1985).
60. The Pennsylvania experience of extrapolating the Wayne rule from precedent
which truly does not support it is an illustration of this lack of critical approach. See
supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.

620

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:3

powers and the essential equation of criminal due process. It is a relic of
a common law system in a criminal law world now governed by statute.
It is antagonistic to the organizing and fundamental Constitutional
principle of that world that once elements of an offense are established
by statute, no court may dilute or defeat the requirement that those
elements be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before a
defendant may be convicted of the crime. The Coward Court's
acknowledgment that Pinkerton negates the elements of an offense is a
fatal admission that it works a constitutional violation into every case
that the mere contrivance of reasonable foreseeability cannot cure.
In the end, like all relics of a bygone age, Pinkerton's place is in a
museum, not the criminal courts of the United States.
B.

Pinkerton as the Ghost of the Common Law Past

The first key to understanding Pinkerton lies in recognizing that, in
virtually all jurisdictions that use it, it is not a creature of statute but is
purely a judicial invention. 6 1 Combined with how it operates, this creates
an unconstitutional tension between the courts and legislatures in those
jurisdictions.
In a roundabout way, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
acknowledged this in Wayne 62 Wayne was not a case where that Court
set out to articulate its conspirator liability rule, but, instead, to state a
clear exception to it in a case of first degree murder.63 A few years
earlier, in Commonwealth v. Huffman 64 the Court decided that for a
defendant to be found guilty of first degree murder under an accomplice
liability theory he had to be shown to have shared the specific intent to
kill the victim. In Wayne, the Court adopted the same rule for
conspiratorial liability and held that a conspirator would be guilty of first
degree murder in a death his partner caused only if he shared the specific
intent to kill the victim. 65
The premise of both Huffman and Wayne is that the legislature
definitively delineated first degree murder as a crime requiring proof that
the defendant specifically intended the death of the victim and that
application of vicarious liability rules would improperly water down that
statutory element of the crime.66 The Wayne Court held that the "simple
application of the co-conspirator rule to cases of first degree murder
61. New Jersey and Texas are two examples where Pinkerton exists by statute. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6 (West 2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(b) (West 2003).
62. Commonwealth v. Wayne, 720 A.2d 456, 464 (Pa. 1998).
63. Id. at 460-62.
64. Commonwealth v. Huffman, 638 A.2d 961 (Pa. 1994).
65. Wayne, 720 A.2d at 464.
66. Id.; Huffman, 638 A.2d at 964.
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would alleviate the Commonwealth's burden of proving an essential
element of the crime,"67 and "[s]uch . a result was clearly not
contemplated by the legislature when it delineated the elements
Allowing a
distinguishing the various degrees of homicide."6 8
that the
requiring
proof
conviction for first degree murder without
defendant personally intended the victim's death would be
"unconscionable."69
The Court's reasoning is compelling and inescapable. Indeed, it
should have been an "A-ha" moment for all of vicarious liability
jurisprudence everywhere. Unfortunately, however, the Wayne Court did
not realize how truly compelling and pervasive this insight is or that its
reasoning inevitably applies to any crime the legislature designates for a
mens rea above strict liability. The "exception" pronounced in Wayne
should have swallowed the "rule" Stantz improperly begat.7 0
This point was reinforced, albeit in back-handed fashion, by the
Chief Justice of Pennsylvania in arguing in later cases that the Wayne
In concurring opinions in
exception should be overturned.
Commonwealth v. Hannibal" and Commonwealth v. Simpson,72 Chief
Justice Castille advocated embracing the Strantz (Pinkerton) rule for all
crimes, arguing in Hannibal that Wayne was an aberrational judicial
modification of the Crimes Code of the Commonwealth. He claimed:
The Crimes Code certainly does not require the Wayne exception to
conspiracy liability. Generally, there is no requirement that
conspirators must specifically contemplate each particular crime that
may occur in furtherance of the conspiracy before liability may
attach. I certainly see no principled basis for this Court's revision of
the law of conspiracy simply because the charge involved is first
73
degree murder.

In making this argument, one would expect that the Chief Justice would
quote the section of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code that he believed
requires conspiracy liability for crimes that he feared the Court violated
by not upholding it in cases of first degree murder. He does not because
no such section exists in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. Indeed, the

67.
68.
69.
70.
Burdell,
71.
72.
73.

Wayne, 720 A.2d at 464.
Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2502(a)-(b) (2010)).
Id.
Commonwealth v. Strantz, 195 A. 75, 79 (Pa. 1937); see also Commonwealth v.
110 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1955).
Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 753 A.2d 1265, 1274 (Pa. 2000).
Commonwealth v. Simpson, 754 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2000).
Hannibal,753 A.2d at 1274-75.
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section dealing with "Liability for Conduct of Another"7 4 is drawn from
the Model Penal Code section on point that openly repudiated Pinkerton
as a basis for liability.75 No other section of the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code permits it or, for that matter, authorizes the Court to rewrite the
Code to put it in.
While the common law of Pennsylvania embraced conspirator
liability before Wayne, the Legislature passed the Crimes Code in 1972
and included an important section barring the Court from creating
criminal liability where none existed on the pages of that Code. Section
107(b) states: "No conduct constitutes a crime unless it is a crime under
this title or another statute of the Commonwealth." 76 Since neither that
title nor any or other Pennsylvania statute provides for anything like
Pinkerton liability, Strantz and its progeny should have died in 1972.
The Chief Justice was thus right when he argued that "[t]here is no
logical reason to single out first degree murder from other crimes in
determining the reach of conspiracy liability"77 but he is right because
there is no conspirator liability under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code at
all. In a sense, the Chief Justice recognized this one month after his

74. The principal sections of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 306 (2010) speak only to
accomplice liability, as set forth below:
§ 306. Liability for conduct of another; complicity
(a) GENERAL RULE-A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed
by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is
legally accountable, or both.
(b) CONDUCT OF ANOTHER-A person is legally accountable for the
conduct of another person when:
(1) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the
commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible
person to engage in such conduct;
(2) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by
this title or by the law defining the offense; or
(3) he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of
the offense.
(c) ACCOMPLICE DEFINED-A person is an accomplice of another
person in the commission of an offense if:
(1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
offense, he:
(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in
planning or committing it; or
(2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his
complicity.
The remaining sections of this statute speak to further aspects of accomplice liability; the
concept of conspiratorial liability is nowhere to be found.
75. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, § 13.3, p. 722-24 (5 h ed. 2009).
76. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 107(b) (2010).
77. Hannibal,753 A.2d at 1275 (Castille, J., concurring).
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opinion in Hannibalwhen, in Simpson, he called upon the Legislature to
repeal Wayne by statute.78
But until the Pennsylvania General Assembly acts, not just to repeal
Wayne but to enact conspirator liability in the Commonwealth, the
judicially created Strantz/Pinkerton rule will do in every case exactly
what the Wayne majority says it does in first degree murder, that is,
"alleviate the Commonwealth's burden of proving an essential element
of the crime" 7 9 and achieve "a result [that] was clearly not contemplated
by the legislature when it delineated the elements."o
Other states have recognized this issue by examining their statutes.
In State v. Stein,8 1 the Washington Supreme Court rebuked a trial court
for instructing a jury alternatively on theories of accomplice liability and
Pinkerton conspirator liability.82 The statutes in Washington (like
Pennsylvania's) are drawn from the MPC and as they did not provide for
conspiratorial liability, the Washington Supreme Court found that
instructions permitting a Pinkerton finding were simply "incompatible
with Washington law." 83 The highest courts of Arizona, Nevada and
New York reached similar conclusions, holding that their statutory
schemes require proof of accomplice liability, that is, a defendant must
have the requisite knowledge and mens rea required of the substantive
crime his confederate committed in his absence.84
Where legislatures want to include Pinkerton liability in their
Crimes Codes, they know how to find the words to do so. The New
Jersey Supreme Court recognized that Pinkerton liability is proper there
because its legislature carefully added language to its "Liability for

78. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 754 A.2d 1264, 1280 (Pa. 2000) (Castille, J.,
concurring).
79. Commonwealth v. Wayne, 720 A.2d 456, 464 (Pa. 1998).
80. Id.
81. State v. Stein, 27 P.3d 184 (Wash. 2001).
82. Id. at 185.
83. Id. at 189.
84. See Evanchyk v. Stewart, 47 P.3d 1114 (Ariz. 2002); People v. McGee, 399
N.E.2d 1177 (N.Y. 1979). The analysis of the issue by the Supreme Court of Nevada is
truly extensive and noteworthy. See Bolden v. State, 124 P.3d 191, 196-200 (Nev. 2005),
rev'd on other grounds; Cortinas v. State, 195 P.3d 315 (Nev. 2008). While concluding
that there was simply no statutory basis for Pinkerton liability in Nevada, the Bolden
Court made a point that will become quite relevant in a matter we will discuss later. That
is, while the acts that constitute joining a conspiracy are not enough, by themselves, to
automatically hold a defendant guilty of the mens rea necessary to commit the specific
intent crimes of his conspirators, those same actions may be enough to hold him
accountable for their general intent crimes where outcomes need not be intended, just
foreseeable on some level. Bolden, 124 P.3d at 200. Professor Pauley indicates that the
North Carolina Supreme Court has also rejected Pinkerton, that Alaska, Maine and North
Dakota reject it by statute and that Massachusetts has not adopted it. See Pauley, supra
note 34, at 4-6 n.9.

624

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:3

Conduct of Another"85 section to include it. 86 Texas also specifically
provides for such liability with respect to substantive offenses graded as
felonies.
Of course, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not the only Supreme
Court to adopt a theory of criminal liability on its own where none exists
in the statutes that define crimes in the first place. The United States
Supreme Court did the same thing in Pinkerton itself. The liability there
was created without an act of Congress or even an attempt to discern
legislative intent.88 Yet Pinkerton is not simply a rule of procedure or
evidence that structures a court's exercise of discretion. It is a substantive
doctrine concocted by a court that extends criminal liability in a way that
supersedes the legislature's judgment. As long as we value separation of
powers as a foundational aspect of constitutional governance,89 the use of
Pinkerton without an enabling statute is, and should be, deeply
problematic.
The IrreconcilabilityofPinkerton and the Rudiments ofDue
Process

C.

That Pinkerton offends separation of powers principles in
jurisdictions that have not adopted it by statute is bad enough. But what
it does to those systems after that is much worse. Stripping away all of
its niceties and particulars, Pinkerton is a judicially created device to
dilute the elements of an offense and lessen the government's burden to
prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. As we now use it, with
85.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6 (West 2010).

86. State v. Bridges, 628 A.2d 270, 275-76 (N.J. 1993).
87. The Texas Penal Code provides as follows:
If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony
is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony
actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was
committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have
been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 7.02(b)

(West 2003).

88. Kreit, supra note 9, at 596. The Court has sometimes gone to remarkable
lengths to find legislative intent, but Pinkerton does not purport to be founded on any
basis originating with the will or intention of Congress. See Antkowiak, supra note 58, at
10 (2008) (discussing the Court's interpretation in United States v. Dixon, 548 U.S. 1
(2006)). As the Third Circuit held in applying Pinkerton liability in the Virgin Islands,
Pinkerton is simply an accepted part of federal, conspiracy jurisprudence. See United
States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir. 2001). Whether that squares with Article 1,
§ 8 of the Constitution is an unanswered question at present.
89. See Bruce A. Antkowiak, Courts, JudicialReview and the Pursuitof Virtue, 45
DUQ. L. REV. 467 (2007); Bruce A. Antkowiak, Contemplating Brazilian Federalism:
Reflections on the Promise ofLiberty, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 599 (2005). Note that the state of
Connecticut, by statute, apparently does authorize its courts to add theories like
Pinkerton. See State v. Walton, 630 A.2d 990, 998 (Conn. 1993).
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or without reasonable foreseeability, it represents a wholesale assault on
the very core of criminal due process.
Consider how it operates in practice. The jury in Moe's trial has to
answer the question of whether Moe is guilty of stealing the ladder and
assaulting Shemp. They will be instructed on the elements of those
crimes as the legislature has set them out, including the mens rea of each,
to wit, specific intent for the theft and recklessness for the aggravated
assault.
But what the court gives by defining the elements, it takes away
with the Pinkerton charge. In Pennsylvania, the jury will be told that
Moe is guilty of those substantive crimes regardless of his mens rea with
respect to them. His conviction hinges merely upon the fact that he was
Larry's conspirator at the time Larry committed them in furtherance of
their plot to burglarize the home. 90 In other jurisdictions that use
Pinkerton, the Court will simply add that the issue is not whether Moe
"could or did intend for that particular crime to be committed" 9' but
"whether [Larry's] commission of the subsequent crime was reasonably
foreseeable" to Moe. 9 2
Thus, by judicial fiat, Pennsylvania completely negates the mens
rea element of intent or recklessness the legislature requires, and, in
other venues, Pinkerton dilutes the statutory mens rea by substituting its
objective standard of reasonable foreseeability, making Moe guilty as
long as he was merely negligent with respect to those offenses. 93 As the
Coward Court and others admit, the state no longer has to prove that Moe
acted with the intent to deprive the owner of his ladder or recklessly
caused serious bodily injury to Shemp. 94 Moe goes to the penitentiary
for these crimes because the judge, without authorization from the
statute, lessened the elements of the offense of conviction.
This is not a process the Constitution permits. Within the past two
decades, the United States Supreme Court has carefully and consistently
articulated a jurisprudence that defines the rudiments of due process in
criminal cases. That jurisprudence coalesced in a line of cases
superficially dealing with the attempt of legislatures to take from the jury
the authority to make findings relevant to the fixing of a maximum
sentence and vest that authority with a judge. The leading case in that
90. Commonwealth v. Wayne, 720 A.2d 456, 463-64 (Pa. 1998) (internal citations
omitted).
9 1. Id.
92. State v. Coward, 972 A.2d 691, 701 (Conn. 2009).
93. See State v. Bridges, 628 A.2d 270 (N.J. 1993); People v. Zielesch, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); United States v. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67 n.3
(D. Mass. 2003).
94. Coward,972 A.2d at 701; see Bridges, 628 A.2d at 270; Zielesch, 101 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 628; Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 67 n.3. See also Kreit, supra note 9, at 589, 613.
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line is Apprendi v. New Jersey.9 5 In prior articles, I have analyzed the
broader impact and importance of the Apprendi line in great detail.
Rather than recapitulating the entirety of that work here, or burdening
you with huge block quotes from it, let me summarize what I hope you
would find if you digested this previous analysis:
*
At the very core of due process in criminal cases is the
recognition of the interrelated concepts of the right to trial by
jury, the presumption of innocence and the demand that the
government prove all elements of an offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. 97 I call this the "jury right," and to the
Supreme Court, it is a principle of "surpassing
importance." 98
*This principle animates a Constitutional process that
justifies the imposition of punishment. That process assigns
a defined role to each of three distinct government entities:
o
o

o

*

the legislature sets out the elements of an offense,
the executive bears the burden of proving those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt against a
presumptively innocent defendant, and
the judiciary presides over the effort to prove the
elements and imposes the authorized punishment if
the proof succeeds. 99

No one government entity (and no combination of them),
however, are empowered to actually authorize the
imposition of punishment. The act of authorization is
retained by the people in the institution of the jury. 00 Thus,
the Constitution "require[s] criminal convictions to rest upon
a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every
element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt." 0 1

95. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000).
96. See Antkowiak, The Irresistible Force,supra note 58, at 21; The Art of Malice,
supra note 58, at 462-64; see generally Antkowiak, Ascent of an Ancient Palladium,
supra note 58.
97. Antkowiak, The IrresistibleForce, supra note 58, at 2.
98. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77.
99. Antkowiak, The IrresistibleForce, supra note 58, at 16-18, 21-23, 27.
100. Id.
101. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995).

THE PINKERTON PROBLEM

2011]

*

627

The legislatures, then, may define the elements of the crime,
but may neither usurp the province of the jury by letting a
judge decide any element nor lessen the government's
burden before the jury through any procedural nuance. 102
The necessary corollary to this is that just as the legislature
cannot negate the jury right, judges cannot do it either by
any judicially created device.' 03

Pinkerton violates the jury right at its most fundamental level.
While the legislature initially fixes the element of mens rea at intent or
recklessness, the court's Pinkerton instruction re-fixes it by reducing it to
negligence or less. Pinkerton also assumes the defendant's entry into the
conspiracy is ipso facto enough to prove proof of causation. Through
Pinkerton, the court intrudes into the legislative realm by amending the
statute, discounts the burden the prosecution is otherwise required to bear
under the Constitution to prove all the elements of the crime charged,
and strips the jury of its power to properly authorize the imposition of
punishment. Pinkerton may have been around a long time, but it is
irreconcilable with the modem rule of Apprendi.
And from a law enforcement perspective, Pinkerton is so
unnecessary. Apprendi affords great deference to a legislature to fashion
elements of an offense. 10 4 For example, if Shemp died from his head
injury instead of just sustaining a bad concussion, Moe would be an
excellent candidate for a conviction under the felony murder rule, what
Pennsylvania calls Second Degree Murder. 05 By statute, Moe would be
guilty because a homicide was committed while he was engaged as an
102. See Antkowiak, The IrresistibleForce, supra note 58, at 4 n.24.
103. See id. at 24-26. After all, the Framers feared judicial tyranny every bit as much
as they did oppression by the legislature, and set the jury right as the fundamental
bulwark against each. See id Since the publication of these articles, the Apprendi line
has continued. See United States v. O'Brien, 130 S.Ct. 2169 (2010) (reaffirming the
principles of fear of judicial tyranny and jury right as a fundamental protection).
104. I have discussed the great deference paid to legislatures in defining elements of
offenses within Constitutional boundaries and the requirement of the right to trial by jury.
Antowiak, The IrresistibleForce, supra note 58, at 5-10. Deference afforded in statutory
sentencing schemes is also evident. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003);
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976).
Apprendi, after all, never disputed the authority of the New Jersey legislature to make the
hate crime aspect of an offense a relevant matter for sentencing but simply imposed
Constitutional limits on how that aspect could be determined consistent with the jury trial
right. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490-97 (2000); see also O'Brien, 130 S.Ct.
at 2175 ("Subject to this constitutional constraint, [Apprendi] whether a given fact is an
element of the crime itself or a sentencing factor is a question for Congress.").
105. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(b) (2008) (defining a criminal homicide as
constituting murder of the second degree "when it is committed while defendant was
engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony").
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accomplice in the commission of one of the enumerated felonies, to wit,
burglary, and the homicide was committed in furtherance of that
crime.106 Malice (mens rea) is required for second degree murder but, by
statute, it is supplied wholly by proof of Moe's intentional participation
with Larry in the dangerous enterprise of burglary.10 7 No judicially
created form of Pinkerton is needed and the jury deliberates on the
elements as the legislature set them out. The jury right and the process it
animates are honored.
But where the legislature insists on a mens rea as a stand-alone
element (intent or otherwise), the Wayne Court was right that the "simple
application of the co-conspirator rule" operates to "alleviate the
Commonwealth's burden of proving an essential element of the
That alleviation is "clearly not contemplated by the
crime.',to
legislature."l 09 To hold a defendant guilty in such a circumstance is not
Under Apprendi, it is fundamentally
just "unconscionable." 10
unconstitutional.
V.

A NEW ROLE FOR PINKERTON

Say what you will about Pinkerton, it does make life easy. The
system is seduced into a comfortable formula for effortless convictions
by saying that Moe's guilt as a conspirator along with his negligence in
not reasonably foreseeing Larry's conduct confederate ipso facto
supplies the mens rea and causation elements of the theft and assault
offenses. 111 The problem, of course, is that a lot of things in law
enforcement would be easier if the Constitution did not intrude as it does
here to call for the end of Pinkerton as we now know it.
If a jurisdiction really wants all conspirators to be convicted of all
crimes their confederates commit during the course of and in furtherance
of the conspiracy, at least let its legislature say so. While that would be
in disregard of advice given by various members of the United States
Supreme Court, 1 2 a statute that explicitly incorporates Pinkerton and its
106. PA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 15.2502B (2d. ed.
2006).
107. 18 PA .CONS. STAT. §2502(b) (2008).
108. Commonwealth v. Wayne, 720 A.2d 456, 464 (Pa. 1998).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See supranotes 4-9 and accompanying text.
112. While Justice Rutledge was critical of the extension of conspiracy liability in
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 648 (1946), and Justices Murphy and
Frankfurter shared similar views in Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 621,
628 (1949), the strongest condemnation came from Justice Jackson in his concurring
opinion in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949). Fresh from his
experiences as the chief United States prosecutor at Nuremberg, Jackson nonetheless
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minimum due process components would more easily survive a
constitutional challenge.l 13 However, no jurisdiction that currently
embraces Pinkerton by judicial invention alone will turn to the statutory
option until and unless a court agrees with the thesis of this article that
Pinkerton and Apprendi cannot exist side by side.l 14
But do we really need Pinkerton for effective and just law
enforcement? While courts cannot wave a judicial wand and smooth out
the road to conviction by making Pinkerton liability automatically equate
with proof of a defendant's mens rea for substantive offenses, a
defendant's conduct in joining a conspiracy need not be disregarded
when the issue is his guilt for a crime committed by another. We need a
new perspective on this, one not as easy as Pinkerton, but one resting on
a much firmer Constitutional footing.
First, let us recognize the reality of conspiracy. Realistically, how
many conspirators do no more than say "I agree" and then do nothing to
help the project along? Deadwood is rare in a conspiracy as conspirators
seldom assume a state of repose after they utter the words "I'm in." To
conspire usually requires engaging in a range of dangerous activities as
the Pinkerton Court itself noted:
For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or
cause to be committed a breach of the criminal laws is an offense of
the gravest character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the
public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime. It involves
deliberate plotting to subvert the laws, educating and preparing the
conspirators for further and habitual criminal practices. And it is
characterized by secrecy, rendering it difficult of detection, requiring
more time for its discovery, and adding to the importance of
punishing it when discovered. 15
Chief Justice Castille articulated this as well:
decried the expansion of the conspiracy doctrine as one representing a "serious threat to
fairness in our administration of justice." Krulewich, 336 U.S. at 446. He traced its
origin to Star Chamber and labeled its Pinkertonprinciple one both "novel and dubious."
Id. at 450-51. Jackson concluded by issuing a stern warning against judge-made law
generally, arguing that "few instruments of injustice can equal that of implied or
presumed or constructive crimes. The most odious of all oppressions are those which
mask as justice." Id. at 456-58.
113. New Jersey has done this with its statute. See State v. Bridges, 628 A.2d 270,
275-76 (N.J. 1993).
114. For a Court to agree would call into question the validity of convictions pending
on appeal in which that issue was raised, of course, but its retroactive impact on other
cases is certainly not clear at this point. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
The Court has decided that the Apprendi line does not require retroactive application.
See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
115. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 644 (quoting United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78,
88(1915)).
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There is a synergy that arises from criminal confederations. People
who might not have the individual courage, the ability, or the ill
judgment to commit a crime on their own become emboldened when
they join with confederates to plan and launch a criminal enterprise.
In recognition of the distinct dangerousness of this criminal
phenomenon, the legislature has codified conspiracy itself as a
separate crime-i.e., conspiracy is not just a theory of liability, it is a
distinct crime. 116
The range of knowledge Moe had by conspiring and the intent with
which he performed actions in support of the scheme are relevant to the
question of whether he is responsible for the intentional theft of the
ladder and the reckless injury to Shemp. The trick is finding the proper
legal framework in which the jury should assess that relevant evidence.
A.

Mens Rea-Post-Pinkerton

With respect to substantive crimes carrying a mens rea of intent (the
theft), the legislatures have provided that a defendant's vicarious liability
must be assessed solely under an accomplice theory.' 17 But Professor
Matthew Pauley is correct that Pinkerton should be understood as a way
to explain (he says expand) accomplice liability in the context of a multidefendant case.118 To be sure, while accomplices and conspirators are
distinct creatures, they certainly share much of the same DNA. Not all
accomplices are conspirators, 19 but the acts and intent that make
someone an accomplice certainly walk them a long way down the path to
being in a conspiracy. And while not all conspirators are necessarily
accomplices in the substantive crimes committed by their confederates,
the specific intent conspirators share and their active support to the
common criminal end draws each much closer to being an accomplice in
those related criminal acts.
Speaking of Pinkerton in accomplice liability terms turns out to be
far more faithful to its historical origins than is seeing it as a distinct
theory for convicting people.

116. Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 753 A.2d 1265, 1275 (Pa. 1998); see also State v.
Coward, 972 A.2d 691, 700-01 (Conn. 2009).
117. This is the Model Penal Code position. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1962);
LaFave, CRIMINAL LAW,

§

13.3, at 722-724 (5th. ed. 2009).

118. Pauley, supra note 34, at 17; see also Susan Brenner, Civil Complicity: Using the
Pinkerton Doctrine to Impose Vicarious Liability in Civil RICO Actions, 81 KY. L.J. 369,
384 (1992-93).
119. See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 844 A.2d 1228, 1238-39 (Pa. 2004) (discussing
the concept of not all accomplices being conspirators); Commonwealth v. Marquez, 980
A.2d 145, 154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (Cleland, J., dissenting).
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Just as the precursor cases for the Strantz version of Pinkerton in
Pennsylvania are all rooted in accomplice liability, 120 so is Pinkerton. It
held:
The criminal intent to do the act is established by the formation of the
conspiracy. Each conspirator instigated the commission of the crime.
The unlawful agreement contemplated precisely what was done. It
was formed for the purpose. The act done was in execution of the
enterprise. The rule which holds responsible one who counsels,
procures, or commands another to commit a crime is founded on the
same principle.121

Indeed, in one of the first applications of Pinkerton, the United States
Supreme Court viewed it as a subset of accomplice liability.
In Nye & Nissen v. United States, a company and its chief officer

(Moncharsh) were convicted of making fraudulent sales to the military
during the Second World War.1 2 2 The officer claimed that the only basis
for his conviction was a misapplied Pinkerton charge. 123 While the
Supreme Court agreed that the lower court gave a faulty Pinkerton
instruction, it sustained the conviction because Moncharsh was also
properly convicted under an aiding and abetting (accomplice) theory.
While there was "no direct evidence" tying him to six substantive
counts of submitting false invoices, 12 4
there is circumstantial evidence wholly adequate to support the
finding of the jury that Moncharsh aided and abetted in the
commission of those offenses. Thus there is evidence that he was the
promoter of a long and persistent scheme to defraud, that the making
of false invoices was a part of that project, that the makers of the
false invoices were Moncharsh's subordinates, that his family was the
chief owner of the business, that he was the manager of it, that his
chief subordinates were his brothers-in-law, that he had charge of the
office where the invoices were made out. 125
The fact that this evidence did "double duty" in proving him guilty of the
conspiracy did not exclude the jury from inferring from the evidence
Moncharsh's knowing participation in the submission of those invoices

as an accomplice. 12 6

120.
121.
122.

See Commonwealth v. Strantz, 195 A.75, 79 (Pa. 1937).
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946) (emphasis added).
Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 616 (1949).

123. Id at 616-17.
124. Id at 619.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 619-20.
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The Court then explained how a proper Pinkerton instruction would
have fit this scenario because "[t]he rule of that case does service where
the conspiracy was one to commit offenses of the characterdescribed in
the substantive counts," making its relationship to accomplice liability
more apparent.127 The "service" Pinkerton does identifies a subset of
accomplice liability in which the parties not only consciously share in the
commission of the criminal act but have reached a prior agreement to
accomplish it. This type of accomplice liability is more "narrow in its
scope"l28 than pure accomplice liability, which can occur regardless of
Where a
whether that sharing reaches the point of conspiracy.
conspiracy is formed and a defendant's role is like that of Moncharsh
(overseer, director, kingpin), a jury could readily conclude that his
knowledge of the scheme and his acts in furtherance of the conspiracy
apply to hold him guilty for substantive crimes "of the character
described in the substantive counts," even though he had no direct
personal involvement in them. 2 9
Although dissenting in the case, Justice Frankfurter reinforced this
understanding of Pinkerton, reading the majority's treatment of the
doctrine to apply only if "there is a connection between the conduct of
the conspiracy and the commission of the substantive offenses," and the
jury is instructed to convict on the substantive counts only if "the
necessary connection" is found.'" 0 The Nevada State Supreme Court has
found the "necessary connection" in cases where the substantive crime
requires proof of intent must be accomplice liability;13 1 but evidence that
flows from a defendant's involvement in a conspiracy is relevant to that
point.
Juries could be given guidance on this. Consider the language in
bold below as an addition to the standard Pennsylvania charge on
accomplice liability:
A defendant may be criminally responsible for an act committed by
another person or persons if the defendant is an accomplice of
another for a particular crime. In this case, you may find that Moe
was an accomplice of Larry with regards to the theft of the ladder if
the following two elements are proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
a. that Moe had the intent of promoting or facilitating the
commission of that crime; and
127. Id at 620 (emphasis added).
128. Id
129. Id. (emphasis added); see State v. Soto, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 20949, at *1
(11th Cir. 2010).
130. Nye andNissen, 336 US at 621 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
131. State v. Bolden, 124 P.3d 191, 201 (Nev. 2005).
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b. Moe [solicited] [commanded] [encouraged] [requested]
Larry to commit it [or] [[aided] [agreed to aid] [or] [attempted
to aid] Larry in planning or committing it].
In determining whether the Commonwealth has proved
these two elements, you should consider:
1. the nature of any agreement you find Moe had with
Larry on a plan of joint action;
2. any actions Moe took to further or carry out that
agreement; and,
3. any knowledge Moe acquired of Larry's anticipated
conduct from those actions and agreement. 32

Under such an instruction, a conspirator such as Moncharsh who is
a central planner and motivating force behind the enterprise may readily
be found to have intended the commission of crimes by his underlings
committed in furtherance of the scheme he hatched and directed. A
lesser conspirator may not be. The facts will be determinative in each
case and the jury should be allowed to consider the applicability of the
relevant reasonable inferences in each circumstance.
But where recklessness is the requisite mens rea of the substantive
crime, accomplice liability has no place since, as the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania pointed out in Commonwealth v. King,'33 where an
unintentional act is charged, accomplice liability is "not logically
possible." 34 To win a conviction, the government need only prove that
the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk
of the harm that his conduct created. 3 5
Applying Nevada law to the Moe and Larry hypothetical, Moe's
level of involvement and his knowledge of his conspirator's actions and
propensities 36 may well permit an inference that he knew the sort of risk
he was creating by engaging in the dangerous business of conspiracy to
burglarize a home.137 In this regard, the Pennsylvania instruction on
132. PA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.306(a) (2d. ed.
2005).
133. Commonwealth v. King, 990 A.2d 1172 (Pa. Super. 2010).
134. Id. at 1178 n.1.
135. 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3) (2010).
136. Pauley, supra note 34, at 24.
137. While specifically rejecting Pinkerton liability for crimes involving specific
intent, Nevada allowed for it where the substantive crime was only one of general intent.
State v. Bolden, 124 P.3d 191, 201 (Nev. 2005). This principle proved to be a point of
undoing for defendant O.J. Simpson, whose robbery conviction was upheld under a
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reckless conduct1 3 8 to support an aggravated assault conviction could be
supplemented in a case like Moe's with the following additional
language, in bold:
A person acts recklessly with respect to serious bodily injury when he
or she consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
such injury will result from his or her conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the
defendant's conduct and the circumstances known to him or her, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that
a reasonable person would observe in the defendant's situation. It is
shown by the kind of reckless conduct from which a life-threatening
injury is almost certain to occur.
In considering whether the defendant acted recklessly in this
case, you may consider whether he acted in concert with another
person to commit a criminal offense, and, in doing so, consciously
disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that serious
bodily injury to another would result from their joint conduct.
In this regard, you may consider the nature of the criminal
offense you find they joined in committing or attempting to
commit, and the defendant's knowledge of the actions and
propensities of the person or persons with whom he acted in
concert.
Thus, when the dust clears after we recognize that Apprendi no

longer allows us to indulge the unconstitutionality of judicially created
Pinkerton liability, defendants like Moe will not automatically be
running free of the crimes their conspirators commit. Responsibility for
specific intent crimes committed by a confederate will be confined to an
informed version of accomplice liability and crimes carrying a lesser
form of mens rea may still be proven when the nature of the object crime
and the degree of the defendant's involvement allow a finding that he
knew (or should have known) the danger his conduct and agreement
created. The "synergy" Justice Castille spoke of in conspiracy may
operate in a given case not only to invigorate the co-defendant but
enlighten the defendant about the scope of the risk his joint actions have
created. A well instructed jury can determine this without the automatic
attribution of liability Pinkerton unconstitutionally prescribes, and
without an amorphous second layer of due process protections that will
no longer be needed.

Pinkerton theory given that robbery in Nevada is a crime of general intent. State v.
Simpson, 2010 WL 4226452, at *7 (Nev. 2010) (unpublished opinion).
138. PA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 15.2702B (2006).
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But we have one more stop to make. Issues of causation are
inextricably intertwined with problems of mens rea and we should note
what causation will look like in multi-defendant cases in the world after
Pinkerton.
B.

CausationPost-Pinkertonl39

Once again, assume that Shemp dies from the wound he received
when Larry pushed him and he hit his head on the gnome. However,
amend the felony murder statute and remove burglary as one of the
designated felonies that would make Moe's murder conviction almost a
foregone conclusion, because the rule of causation in second degree
murder cases in Pennsylvania is very broad. 140 In such a scenario, Moe
would be a candidate for conviction of either Third Degree Murder
(where malice is found in a heightened degree of recklessness)141 or
Involuntary Manslaughter (which requires either recklessness of a lesser
degree than Third Degree Murder or criminal negligence)142 as long as
the jury also finds that Moe "caused" the death of Shemp.
139. For a wonderful discussion of causation in cases involving multiple defendants,
see Joshua Dressler, REASSESSING THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF ACCOMPLICE
LIABILITY: NEW SOLUTIONS TO AN OLD PROBLEM, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 91 n.1 (1985)
(speaking of causation in terms of accomplice liability, but adding that all of his
arguments there "apply even more forcefully to Pinkerton conspiracy theory").
140. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cotton, 487 A.2d 830 (Pa. Super. 1984) (finding
that robbers caused the death of their victim based upon a heart attack he suffered from
the stress of the event).
141. The Pennsylvania Jury Instruction on malice to support Third Degree Murder
states that
[flor murder of the third degree, a killing is with malice if the perpetrator's
actions show his or her wanton and willful disregard of an unjustified and
extremely high risk that his or her conduct would result in death or serious
bodily injury to another. In this form of malice, the Commonwealth need not
The
prove that the perpetrator specifically intended to kill another.
Commonwealth must prove, however, that the perpetrator took action while
consciously, that is, knowingly, disregarding the most serious risk he or she
was creating, and that, by his or her disregard of that risk, the perpetrator
demonstrated his or her extreme indifference to the value of human life.
PA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS

§

15.2502C (2d. ed. 2005).

142. The Pennsylvania Model Jury Instructions state,
[a] defendant's conduct [including any failure to perform a legal duty,] is
reckless when he or she is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that death will result from his or her conduct, the nature
and degree of the risk being such that it is grossly unreasonable for him or her
to disregard it. A defendant's conduct is grossly negligent when he or she
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result
from his or her conduct, the nature and degree of the risk being such that it is
grossly unreasonable for him or her to fail to recognize the risk. In deciding
whether the defendant's conduct was reckless or grossly negligent, you should
consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including the nature and intent of
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Just as his mens rea for those crimes cannot be automatically
supplied by the judicially created Pinkerton rule, Moe's membership in
the conspiracy must not, on constitutional grounds, automatically supply
the causation element either. But his actions as a conspirator are
nonetheless relevant to the causation issue inherent in each of these
substantive offenses.
Pennsylvania's statutel43 on causation is identical to the MPC.144 Its
first section deals with whether the defendant's conduct is "an antecedent
but for which the result in question would not have occurred."l 45 While
some commentators argue that the "but for" language may make proving
causation by a conspirator very difficult,14 6 the height of that particular
hurdle is not that daunting.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has described it this way:
"Thus, if the victim's death is attributable entirely to other factors and
not at all brought about by the defendant's conduct, no causal connection
exists and no criminal liability for the result can attach."l 4 7 This means
that to avoid being a "but for" cause, the act of conspiring must be
wholly irrelevant to the occurrence of the substantive criminal act.148

the defendant's conduct and the circumstances known to [him] [her]. As the
definitions I just gave you indicate, the recklessness or gross negligence
required for involuntary manslaughter is a great departure from the standard of
ordinary care. It is a departure that shows a disregard for human life or an
indifference to the possible consequences of one's conduct. Compared with
recklessness and gross negligence, the malice required for third-degree murder
is a more blameworthy state of mind. The essence of malice is an extreme
indifference to the value of human life.
PA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 15.2504 (2010).
143. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 303 (LEXIS 2010).
144. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (1962).
145.

18 PA. CONS. STAT.

§ 303(a)(1)

(LEXIS 2010).

146. See Pauley, supra note 34, at 28; Kreit, supra note 9, at 614-15.
147. See Commonwealth v. Rementer, 598 A.2d 1300, 1305 (Pa. Super. 1991);
Commonwealth v. Nunn, 947 A.2d 756, 760 (Pa. Super. 2008).
148. My personal experience with causation in Pennsylvania convinced me that it
creates a nominal barrier to conviction in all but the most unusual of cases. I was counsel
for the defendant in In Interest of Hyduke, 538 A.2d 66 (Pa. Super. 1988), a case which
featured the following bizarre set of facts. Hyduke was driving north on a two lane
country road when, for reasons unclear, he lost control of his car and found himself
sliding across the road and onto the berm of the southbound lane. His car sheared off a
telephone pole and, while his car continued into a field, the pole fell across the highway.
A driver of a pickup truck coming southbound came over the crest of a hill, saw the pole
and tried to stop. There was some indication that the trucks tires were mostly bald, but,
in any event, the pickup hit the pole, rode up on it, and was directed by the pole to a stop
in the northbound lane. A third car, proceeding north and travelling at a high rate of
speed, then rounded a curve. The driver was going too fast to stop before slamming into
the pickup, killing both occupants of the third car. Id at 67-68. The Superior Court held
that Hyduke caused their death. Id. at 71.

2011]

THE PINKERTON PROBLEM

637

There are surely conspiracy cases in which the defendant was such a
low level individual performing such a minor part of the overall
operation that he was truly outside the links of causation that led to a
particular offense. 14 9 But I would argue with some confidence that
Moe's actions did form a "but for" link in the fatal injury to Shemp. A
jury might readily conclude that Larry lacked the "individual courage,
the ability, or the ill judgment to commit [these] crime[s] on [his] own"
and that he became "emboldened when [he] join[ed] with [Moe] to plan
and launch a criminal enterprise."15 0 Given what "but for" really means,
Moe's agreement, conduct and direction to Larry may certainly have
forged a link in the "but for" chain of the assault offense here.
The second aspect of causation relates to situations where the harm
that was intended or the harm the defendant consciously risked (or
negligently failed to foresee) did not occur but some other harm did.' '
In both cases, causation will still be present where the actual harm
caused is less severe than intended (or portended), where it is inflicted on
a different intended (or probable) victim, or where "the actual result
involves the same kind of injury or harm (as that designed or
contemplated) [or] (as the probable result) and is not too remote or
accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing on the actor's liability or on
the gravity of his offense."l 5 2
The Pennsylvania charge on causation properly puts this matter in
the hands of the jury without reference to any form of Pinkerton liability
by instructing that before a defendant can be found guilty of any degree
of homicide, his acts must be found to have been a "direct cause" of the
death. Direct cause is explained like this:
1. The defendant has been charged with [killing] [causing the death
of] [name of victim]. To find the defendant guilty of this offense,
you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's
conduct was a direct cause of [his] [her] death.

149. E.g., the day laborer who agrees to help off load the marijuana boat for $500
would likely have had no causal effect on the decision by the drug kingpin and his
assassins to kill the person they thought was an informant.
150. Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 753 A.2d 1265, 1275 (Pa. 1998).
151. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 303(b)-(c) (LEXIS 2010).
152. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 303(b)(2)-(c)(2) (2010). The language that demands
consideration of whether the injury or harm is "not too remote or accidental in its
occurrence to have a bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense"
seems to be the exact sort of consideration Professor Noferi calls the "new" due process
limit on Pinkerton except that it may be enforced by a jury as part of its deliberation. See
generally Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A New Due Process Limit on Pinkerton, 33
AM. J.CRIM. L. 91 (2006).
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2. In order to be a direct cause of a death, a person's conduct must be
a direct and substantial factor in bringing about the death. There can
be more than one direct cause of a death. A defendant who is a direct
cause of a death may be criminally liable even though there are other
direct causes.
3. A defendant is not a direct cause of a death if [the actions of the
victim] [the actions of a third person] [the occurrence of another
event] [event] plays such an independent, important, and overriding
role in bringing about the death, compared with the role of the
defendant, that the defendant's conduct does not amount to a direct
and substantial factor in bringing about the death.
4. A defendant's conduct may be a direct cause of a death even
though his or her conduct was not the last or immediate cause of the
death. Thus, a defendant's conduct may be a direct cause of a death
if it initiates an unbroken chain of events leading to the death of the
victim.
5. A defendant whose conduct is a direct cause of a death
cannot avoid liability on the grounds that the victim's
preexisting physical infirmities contributed to his or her
death.153
This instruction allows the jury to consider all of Moe's personal
actions as well as his knowledge of Larry generally and Larry's acts and
propensities in judging whether Moe, along with Larry, caused Shemp's
death. If they so found, the jury would then consider instructions on the
various kinds of non-intentional mens rea that could support a verdict of
Third Degree Murder or Involuntary Manslaughter. Even with Pinkerton
out of the picture, there is no guarantee that Moe would escape a
homicide conviction here.154
VI. CONCLUSION

There is a Pinkerton problem in Pennsylvania and everywhere the
doctrine has not been adopted by statute. It cannot be cured simply by
153. PA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 15.2501C (2d ed.
2005).
154. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. King, 990 A.2d 1172 (Pa. Super. 2010) (non-shooter

defendant in an armed robbery in which the victim was killed acquitted of robbery,
conspiracy and second degree murder, but convicted of third degree murder under a
Pinkertontheory). But even without Pinkerton, did he not, by participating so actively in
an armed robbery of a drug dealer, knowingly create a substantial risk of death and, when
the death occurred, did he not play enough of a role in causing it that his conviction
should be upheld?
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including reasonable foreseeability in its formula or by conjuring up a
second layer of due process protection that is based on little more than
the gut instinct of a court that the doctrine should not apply in a given
case.
In every place where Pinkerton lives by the will of the courts alone,
the doctrine should be retired given its impact on the jury right and the
grave due process problems it creates. In retiring it, however, the system
must not ignore the fact that traditional, constitutionally acceptable mens
rea and causation analyses are not offended by reference to the conduct a
defendant undertakes when he joins and operates within a conspiracy.
Simple modifications to existing jury instructions can make that all
reasonably clear.
That is the help to the judges and practitioners this old warhorse's
best efforts at wisdom can give today. For an elaborate display of
plumage, visit your local zoo.

